

A Model-Theoretic Analysis of the Characteristics that Differentiate Pluralism from Populism in a Democratic Context

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31 March 2019

Abstract

In this article, I present a comparative analysis of the deontic logic of tolerance and respect which is associated with Social Pluralism and the deontic logic of disaffection and resentment which is associated with Populism. I make particular reference to the examination by Elena Lisanyuk of the characteristics of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and their representation in model-theoretic terms. My analysis shows that the subject's accountability for blameworthiness is judged intuitively to be of a greater significance than that for praiseworthiness, and accordingly more liable to the applicable consequences such as guilt and rebuke. Thus the pluralist is more deserving of affective (in this case negative) sentiment in the eyes of the populist than is the populist in the eyes of the pluralist. I show that the logical dimension of epistemics reveals that, while the disaffection and resentment show some sense of personable identification with the object of resentment, they will by necessity carry greater emphasis and have greater efficacy than the integrity and honesty that characterises Social Pluralism.

1 Thuringia International School and Social Pluralism

Thuringia International School, Weimar (THIS) was established in the year 2000 as an initiative of the Thuringian state government in Germany. The goal was to provide an education predominantly in English to the children of internationally-mobile and internationally-oriented families resident in the region who might benefit from such a school. THIS now has 320 students aged 4 - 18. It is a private fee-charging school, in part because the state provides less financial support than it does to state schools, although the families of 20% of students are provided a scholarship based on financial need. The school is authorised to offer the educational programs of the International Baccalaureate (IB),

which value a learning environment in whereby students strive to be, among other attributes, inquirers, reflective, and principled.

We act with integrity and honesty, with a strong sense of fairness and justice, and with respect for the dignity and rights of people everywhere.¹

The majority of students at THIS have at least one parent with German citizenship, but there are many families with non-German and/or mixed citizenship. Accordingly the school values the notion of Social Pluralism, which supports minority groups within society maintaining their distinctive cultural identities. In common with the values of liberal democracy at large, the practices associated with the distinguishing features of minority cultures are respected on the grounds they can operate in an integrated manner with the broader scope of society avoiding, for instance, any religious conservatism that counters pluralist identities and that in general can respect both the integrity of others and the laws of society.

In January 2019, in opposition to the school's values and practises, Professor Dr. Helbig, Social Scientist and Injustice Researcher at the University of Erfurt, argued in an article published by the Thüringer Landeszeitung² that only the affluent elite are able to afford and therefore access the high quality education provided by private schools such as THIS. He argued that:

When migrant children come to us, they should be taught normally in German at German schools. Only the global elite are permitted that this be out of the question for their children.

„Wenn Migratenkinder zu uns kommen, dann sollen sie ganz normal auf Deutsch an deutschen Schulen unterrichtet werden. Nur den global agierenden Eliten gesteht man zu, dass das für Ihre Kinder nicht in Frage kommt.“

He argued further that the scale of injustice in society created by schools such as THIS is reprehensible and the cause of much resentment:

¹ The IB learner profile: www.ibo.org/benefits/learner-profile

² Artikel von Sibylle Göbel, „Bildung ist in Thüringen käuflich“, Thüringer Landeszeitung vom 31. Januar 2019, Seite 4

The social distribution in private schools is problematic. This has been demonstrated once again by the investigation conducted by of the German Institute for Economic Research. In the East we have a huge fragmentation; 23% of all academic families send their children to private schools – an increase of 20% compared to 1995.

„Problematisch daran ist die soziale Verteilung auf den Privatschulen. Das hat auch noch einmal die Untersuchung des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung gezeigt. Im Osten haben wir ein massives auseinanderbrechen: 23 Prozent aller Akademikereltern schicken ihre Kinder auf eine Privatschule – ein Anstieg um 20 Prozentpunkte gegenüber 1995.“

The arguments made by Prof. Helbig were no doubt grounded by a principled social conscience committed to notions of fairness and justice, and reflected the long and laudable intellectual heritage of egalitarianism associated with Marx and the Young Hegelians before. However they were couched in a populist rhetoric of indignation and resentment, the likes of which has become increasingly common throughout Europe in the past decade, and that accordingly deserves closer scrutiny.

2 The Rise of Populism

In the UK and USA, the populist appeal of Brexit and of President Trump respectively has been attributed in the popular media to the alienation and resentment felt by the traditional ‘white working and service class’, which was once at the centre of mainstream society but has suffered significantly from the decline of manufacturing and other blue-collar employment, and that furthermore perceives itself as facing a loss of credibility and standing in its respective communities as a result of immigration and the rise of alternative cultural values, and subsequently is angry at the apparent unwillingness of mainstream politics to acknowledge its disaffection.

Echoing the comments made by Prof. Helbig, Cayla³ has argued that populist movements all across Europe, including the French “Yellow Jackets”, share in common both exasperation at the fiscal injustices forced upon them by social elites and a subsequent demand for a greater sense of equality, specifically:

³ David Cayla (2019). *The Rise of Populist Movements in Europe: A Response to European Ordoliberalism?* Web, American Economic Society (accessed 1 March 2019)

between educated people that enjoy free movement across the continent and common people who are attached to their national territory. (7)

A recent analysis of PEGIDA by Vorländer, Herold and Schäller⁴ argued that right-wing Populism has now moved beyond the Anglophile and Francophone worlds and developed significant impetus in German politics. In particular, the authors argued that the rapid rise of PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes/Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West) several years ago represented:

the public appearance of a new type of right-wing populist movement of indignation, which did not articulate a specific protest, but instead staged a diffuse outcry against everything that could be linked with “official” politics and media. (xiv)

The authors argued further, again resonating the (left-wing) stance taken by Prof. Helbig, that the new right-wing Populism has made resentment socially acceptable by means of:

the assertion of cultural and national identity, the reclamation of a patriotic and ethnic nationalism, [and] the restitution of sovereign statehood. (xiv)

3 The Respective Logics of Pluralism and Populism

Despite their differences, underlying both the position of Social Pluralism as represented by THIS and that of Populism as represented by Prof. Helbig, there are at least two commonalities: firstly that the different positions claim coherency and can be justified in terms of rational argument, and secondly that they share a valuing of equality. In the case of the latter, however, the criteria for defining equality used in each argument is very different.

The pluralist position interprets associable actions as an assertion of equality, while the populist position interprets these same actions as the opposite, as a refutation of equality. One party views equality in terms of societal structures supervening upon the rights and freedoms of the individual, and the other as individual rights and freedom supervening upon societal structures.

⁴ Hans Vorländer, Maik Herold, Steven Schäller (2018). *PEGIDA and New Right-Wing Populism in Germany, New Perspectives in German Political Studies*. Cham, Springer.

Furthermore both arguments assume a different meta-ethical position. Pluralism asserts a stance that, while paradoxical, seeks to be inclusive. It argues for an absolutist position whereby multiple foundational absolute positions can co-exist in a relativist manner. It implies minority groups living side-by-side with the majority. In contrast Populism asserts a stance of exclusion. It argues for value-monism whereby those outside of the mainstream are considered to harbour values that are no longer valid and accordingly are required to consent to a process of assimilation (i.e. their children being required to attend state school).

However both positions also have affective elements that are justified rationally. Pluralism is an assertion of the integrity perceived in social norms towards equality that in turn engender praiseworthiness and thereafter tolerance, and that identifies activities associated with credible propriety, which in turn merit respect. In contrast Populism bases its arguments upon a lack of integrity perceived in societal norms towards equality that in turn engender blameworthiness and thereafter resentment, and that identifies activities associated with censurable misconduct, which in turn merit disdain and reproof.

4 The Logic of Disaffection and Resentment

The arguments outlined by Prof. Helbig reveal how the rationalism of Populism comprises not only of ethical norms but also a logic of disaffection. A more detailed analysis of this phenomenon is outlined in the work of Da Silva & Vieira⁵. They reject the standard ontological approach to characterising Populism, which typically pertains to its metaphysical contents, either to the physical construct of social groups and the material features established independent of human situatedness and knowledge, or to its hermeneutical-historical status. Instead they assert an epistemological approach that seeks to identify the actual structure underpinning populist arguments, and in particular the rationalisations and epistemic logic employed in the organisation of that knowledge structure.

Da Silva & Vieira begin by reaffirming that Populism is a genuine outgrowth of democracy. They state:

its logic cannot be understood separately apart from democracy's fundamental commitment to the principle of equality. (6)

⁵ Da Silva, Filipe Carreira and Vieira, Monica Brito (2018). *Populism as a Logic of Political Action*. European Journal of Social Theory 1–16, Sage.

In this context they situate Populism as a consequence of another paradox, in this case located at the core of liberal democracy. An orientation upon inclusion exposes exclusion, which in turn undermines the former and reinforces the latter. When society espouses values of egalitarian inclusion and is unable to fully deliver on its promises, then there is a sense of betrayal and resentment. They argue that, above all else, it is the resentment derived from this paradox that motivates the essential logic of Populism.

They acknowledge the historical precursors of this approach, of grounding political action and ultimately human identity in a logic of disaffection, and subsequently they point to the work of National Socialist Carl Schmitt whose logic of enmity was placed at the centre of his critique of democratic liberalism. Following from the methodological anti-positivism of the Erfurt-born Thuringian Max Weber⁶, who argued that the state is a relation of men to other men over whom they are in a position of authority and dominance, Schmitt argued that the abstract logic of democracy depends upon identity-couplings, between the ruler and the ruled, between the sovereign and the subject, and also between the friend and the enemy. He asserted that it is the very logic of intuitive thought that entails the stranger, who is the 'other', is always perceived in an particularly forceful manner as something essentially alien. Accordingly, both human and national identities are based on the antagonistic divide between the self, inclusive of family and community, and this other. As a consequence of this, he argued that resentment and conflict are inescapable in political action.

Kennedy⁷ translates and quotes Schmitt's *Der Begriff des Politischen* (1927) in the context of Hegel's master/slave relationship:

The political energy need not be morally evil, or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor and it can even seem useful to do business with him. He is the other, the stranger whose essence it is that in cases of conflict he means the negation of one's own kind of existence and therefore will be resisted or fought in order to preserve one's own way of life." (102)

⁶ Max Weber, 1919. *On Politics*. Panarchy.org, web.

⁷ Kennedy, Ellen, 2004. *Constitutional Failure, Carl Schmitt in Weimar*. Durham and London, Duke University Press.

Da Silva & Vieira also draw on classical work pertaining to the strategies of political persuasion, notably Aristotle's *The Art of Rhetoric*, which makes a clear distinction in political argument between the logical characteristics of hatred on the one side and anger on the other. While hatred is all-encompassing and entails a refutation of the object of hatred, potentially leading to violence, in contrast anger is taken to be a communicative tool and requires the presence of the subject to whom the anger is directed. Aristotle's Section 2 of Book 2⁸ begins:

Anger may be defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one's friends. If this is a proper definition of anger, it must always be felt towards some particular individual, e.g. Cleon, and not 'man' in general.

Da Silva & Vieira argue that, similarly, the rationalisations of Populism do not involve hatred per se. Populism does not lead to terrorism; Brexiteers drive their cars slowly as a sign of protest⁹, but do not drive down others on the street; the deep identity divisions associated with Pluralism and Populism in the UK have created a political crisis, but not civil war. Instead the logic of Populism involves the projection of an anger and resentment that take for granted identification between sectors of the populace, between the disaffected and the elite, and that makes reference to a set of normative obligations assumed to exist between them. The logic of Populism is thus built upon resentment at the apparent violation of norms of justice and towards those considered to be responsible for the violation.

5 The Logical Dimension of Thought and the Weimar Heritage

Having asserted a rationalist underpinning to the disaffection and resentment characterising Populism, regrettably Da Silva & Vieira do not provide further analysis of these features. They argue, almost apologetically, that the epistemic structure of Populism is not determined by a logic founded upon any axiological foundations and any associated formal system of inference, but merely as something with particular necessary features that are subject in general terms to logical analysis.

⁸ Aristotle (350 B.C.E.). *Rhetoric*. Trans. W. Rhys Roberts. The Internet Classics Archive (accessed March 1, 2019).

⁹ *Leaver go-slow on roads leads to prosecutions*. The Guardian Newspaper online, 23 Mar 2019.

In contrast, the analysis here shall assert that it is possible to further explore the underlying differences between Pluralism and Populism by reference to different branches of logic theory, and in particular to deontic modal formulations.

An analytical model-theoretic approach such as this also has historical precursors. While avoiding too great a tangent, it will not go unmentioned that many of these formulations can be traced back to and therefore associated with the Weimar heritage. If the historical development of logic theory added a transcendental approach to classical logic under Kant's tutelage, and this thereafter became splintered into different approaches, then the splintering occurred in the historical Duchy of Weimar-Eisenach.

Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*, written while a Professor of Philosophy at the duchy's university at Jena (and thereafter Husserl's 'Logical Investigations' written in nearby Gottingen) sought to establish the metaphysical grounding for thought, including that of Aristotelian analytics and its syllogistic entailments. Fichte argued¹⁰ that:

A concept is never anything other than the very activity of intuiting - simply grasped, not as agility, but as a state of repose and determinacy. This is true of the concept of the I as well.
(118)

Thereafter Hegel sought to justify logic as metaphysics itself whereby rationalism is subject to a gradual dialectic movement towards the absolute. He wrote¹¹:

The concrete shape of the content is resolved by its own inherent process into a simple determinate quality. Thereby it is raised to logical form, and its being and essence coincide; its concrete existence is merely this process that takes place, and is *eo ipso* logical existence.
(33)

Several generations later, Frege sought to establish equivalence between formal logic and mathematics and, as far as conceptual terms were concerned, to differentiate the sense of a word from its reference, the latter of which could be used as substitutions for variables in logic

¹⁰ Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1798). *An attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre*, in Introduction to the *Wissenschaftslehre*, trans. D. Breazeale. Cambridge, Hackett (1994).

¹¹ Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1807) *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J.B. Baillie. London, Dover (2003).

procedures. In his *Begriffsschrift*, subtitled as a formalised language of pure thought modelled upon the logic of arithmetic, he wrote on the very first page¹²:

A judgment is always to be expressed by means of the sign

$$\vdash$$

(1)

It is the Fregean tradition that has guided most predominantly the analytic tradition of philosophical discourse ever since. In most cases formal logic has been pursued independently of any practical application, however there has also arisen out of the tradition outlined above a range of pragmatic logics that can be used to analyse matters such as the logical dimension of responsibility, including that of disaffection and resentment.

6 The Logical Dimension of Responsibility

Responsibility can be modelled as emerging out of liability on the one hand and accountability on the other.

- Subject α (e.g. the child) believes subject β (e.g. the teacher) should help;
- Subject β is thus responsible for action;
- Subject α has the right to be a beneficiary of the action.

Developed further, these types of interactions form a complex causal and axiological network of relations between agents and actions. The standard means for establishing symbolic notation to describe such relations borrows from mathematical set theory, which defines the collection of objects included in a set. If α (e.g. the child) is a member of set θ (e.g. the class of children), then this is shown as $\alpha \in \theta$ or as $\mathcal{F}(\alpha, \theta)$ whereby \mathcal{F} is the function describing the rules of membership for any object such as α that is included in set θ .

For example, if responsibility includes the notion of liability, then this can be expressed in the following manner, where L is representative of the function 'liability', α is an object (or the child), and β is liable for α .

$$L(\alpha, \beta)$$

¹² Frege, Gottlob (1879). *Begriffsschrift*, in *Translations from the Philosophical Writing of Gottlob Frege*, trans. P.T. Geach. Oxford, Basil Blackwell (1952).

In terms of epistemic logic, an expression can be formulated with K as a knowledge-function whereby there is a subject α who knows that subject β is liable for assisting α .

$$(\exists\alpha)K\alpha(L(\alpha, \beta))$$

7 Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness

A similar but more intricate approach is used in Lisanyuk's axiological analysis of responsibility¹³ whereby positive praiseworthiness (labelled here as **Plu**) is modelled in the following terms:

Plu $\varphi \wedge \text{Shall}[\alpha \text{ cstit}] \varphi \wedge [\alpha \text{ cstit}] \varphi$

- There is an assertion of φ , and
- Subject α has a duty in general to φ , and
- Subject α asserts φ .

Thereafter Lisanyuk models blameworthiness (labelled here as **Pop**) in terms of the following expression:

Pop $\neg\varphi \wedge \text{Shall}[\alpha \text{ cstit}] \varphi \wedge [\alpha \text{ iit}] \neg\varphi \wedge \text{E} [\alpha \text{ dstit}] \varphi$

- There is a refutation of φ , and
- Subject α has a duty in general to φ , and
- Subject α has intent to refute φ , and
- Subject α might otherwise have taken steps to φ (but hasn't).

If these models are applied to the motivations of Pluralism and Populism and the variable α is read as equality, then the definition of positive praiseworthiness **Plu** can be used to indicate that the pluralist position is motivated in the following way:

- There is an assertion of equality, and
- Subject α has a duty in general to assert equality, and
- Subject α asserts equality.

Whereby this leads to praiseworthiness and respect.

¹³ Lisanyuk, Elena (2013). *Five Steps to Responsibility*. Revista da Faculdade de Direito da UFMG 63:125-149

Similarly the definition of blameworthiness **Pop** can be used to indicate that the populist position is motivated in the following way:

- There is a refutation of equality, and
- Subject α has a duty in general to assert equality, and
- Subject α has the intent to refute equality,
- Subject α might otherwise have taken steps to assert equality (but hasn't).

Whereby this leads to both blameworthiness and resentment.

This initial reading seems to substantiate the intuition that the major difference between the two arguments lies in the contrasting interpretations of φ . As indicated previously, the pluralist position interprets certain actions (e.g. establishing an international school) as an assertion of φ , of equality, while the populist position interprets these same actions as a refutation of φ , negating equality. One party views equality in terms of societal structures supervening upon the rights and freedoms of the individual, and the other as individual rights and freedom supervening upon societal structures. This is the age-old dispute between Liberalism and Republicanism. However the Lisanyuk expressions reveal additional factors, which must be further explored.

8 Strategic Action

Exploring Lisanyuk's analysis further, the second conjunct in both of the expressions **Plu** and **Pop** is the same, employing the following symbols:

$$[\alpha \text{ cstit}] \varphi$$

The symbol 'stit' is used to indicate 'sees-to-it-that', and the preceding 'c' is used to indicate generality. The expression is thus an indication of generalised strategic action, read as: subject α generally (or strategically) sees-to-it-that action φ is done.

The expression is founded upon axiom T, which according to the conventions of modal logic is a statement of veracity, of actuality/effectiveness. If p is necessarily true, then it is actually true.

Axiom T: $\Box p \rightarrow p$ necessarily-p entails that p

In deontic terms, this is interpreted by Lisanyuk as the following:

Axiom T: $[\alpha \text{ cstit } \varphi] \rightarrow \varphi$ α sees-to-it-that $\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$ (veracity)

This assertion of veracity can accordingly be brought to bear upon implicated relations. For instance, subject α establishes goal g and accordingly initiates action φ . In other words, there is a goal g whereby subject α is motivated by this goal and accordingly acts by way of veracity to do action φ :

$$(\exists g)\alpha(g, \varphi)$$

Lisanyuk asserts the same relation (wants, does) with an expression that is intended to further establish deontic coherency, whereby the agent is acting in a way that makes sense, and to assert the principle of free will, whereby the agent is acting in a deliberative manner. Thus:

$$g\alpha \rightarrow \alpha[\text{cstit}]\varphi.$$

9 Responsibility of Duty

This second conjunct in **Plu** and **Pop** also employs the operator 'Shall', which needs explanation. In standard deontic logic, a representation of a dyadic relation between a subject and an action is written in the same format as previously described:

$OB(\alpha, \varphi)$ There is an obligation function (i.e. OB) for subject α to do action φ

An expression combining standard deontic and epistemic modalities can be written thus:

$(\exists \alpha)K\alpha(OB(\alpha, \varphi))$ There is a subject α whereby α knows there is an obligation for α to do φ

In this context, Lisanyuk introduces the following expression:

$\text{Shall}[\alpha \text{ cstit}]\varphi$ Subject α shall (has a duty to) see-to-it-that φ

Lisanyuk explains the features of the operator 'Shall' as representing the normative responsibility of duty in utilitarian terms and as assuming free will, the agent's efficacy to act without restriction. However it also uses the deontic equivalent of system K, which, like Kant's Categorical Imperative, encompasses the rule of necessitation:

NR: $\varphi \rightarrow OB(\varphi)$

Pragmatically, if society values φ , then it is necessary (there is an obligation) that members of society do φ . However while standard deontic logic¹⁴, employing OB for obligation and IM for impermissible/prohibition, asserts objective norms, the operator 'Shall' encompasses both an axiomatic structure embodying the strict modality of necessity and also a weak aspect that asserts norms in a non-determinist manner.

Lisanyuk argues that these combine to enable a form of strategic non-deliberative action that can be compared to Leibniz's *Fatum Stoicum*, which, in the context of early eighteenth century religious sentiment, asserts the omnipotence and necessity of events as pertaining to both divine providence and also human agency. Poma¹⁵ states that this principle views submission to this deific determinacy as indicative both of obedience to divine will and of human acumen. However it also asserts that divine omnipotence coincides with the absolute arbitrariness of that very same deific determinacy, and accordingly with the essential randomness of events. Consequently the human subject cannot know divine providence because it possesses no congruency with the contingency of the physical world. It is this principle that explains why all events are attributable to God even though they imply divine arbitrariness.

This approach is an equivalent of modern compatibilism, which views free will and determinism as mutually compatible. Accordingly, in these circumstances, the expression defining the pluralist motivation can be read as: subject α has by necessity a general duty to see-to-it-that there is equality, and accordingly subject α asserts that action freely.

In contrast, the expression defining the populist motivation, while subject to these same principles, is more complex as shall become apparent.

¹⁴ McNamara, Paul. *Deontic logic*. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Ed.) ed. Edward N. Zalta.

¹⁵ Poma, Andrea (2012). *The Impossibility and Necessity of Theodicy: The 'Essais' of Leibniz*, trans. Alice Spencer. London, Springer.

10 Intent and Transitivity

Expression **Pop**, representing the characteristics of Populism, includes the symbols 'iit'. Lisanyuk uses this to assert that blameworthiness includes an additional motivation whereby goal-oriented action embodies a more purposeful degree of intent.

$$[\alpha \text{ cstit}] \varphi \rightarrow [\alpha \text{ iit}] \varphi \quad \text{Subject } \alpha \text{ sees-to-it-that } \varphi \text{ entails that } \alpha \text{ intends action } \varphi$$

Lisanyuk distinguishes intent from mere purposefulness by affording it transitivity.

Axiom 4 $OB(\varphi) \rightarrow OB(OB(\varphi))$ transitivity

An antisymmetric relation R is transitive in the following circumstances: iff $\forall x, y, z \in W$, then xRy and yRz implies that xRz . The expression is configured in axiomatic terms based on axiom 4, which in terms of alethic modality asserts that whatever is necessary is necessarily necessary.

Axiom 4 $\Box A \rightarrow \Box \Box A$ transitivity

This in turn can be represented in epistemic logic as an indication of self-knowledge. Subject α knows that subject α knows proposition p . The assertion avoids the KK regress (α knows that α knows that α knows that... and so forth) given it is justified by insight and not by inference; inferences are not justified deductively in pragmatic logics.

$$(\forall \alpha) K\alpha K\alpha p \quad \text{self-knowledge}$$


Accordingly the application of transitivity to Lisanyuk's symbolisation of action reads: subject α asserts φ entails that subject α intends (asserts the assertion of) φ . This is a more forceful assertion of agency, and is thus more culpable, in this case for blameworthiness.

11 The Obligatory Permissible and Euclidean Necessity


In the fourth conjunct of expression **B** Lisanyuk makes further use of deontic axiomatisation, including that based on the Euclidean axiom 5, according to the conventions of modal logic. An antisymmetric

relation R is Euclidean (but not transitive) in the following circumstances: iff $\forall x, y, z \in W$, then xRy and xRz implies that yRz .

Transitive relation



Euclidean relation



Accordingly if an act is obligatory according to societal norms, then according to axiom D it is also permissible and, if an act is permissible, then, according to Euclidean principles, it is obligatory that it is permissible.

Axiom D	$OB(\varphi) \rightarrow PE(\varphi)$	serial
Axiom 5	$PE(\varphi) \rightarrow OB(PE(\varphi))$	Euclidian

Additionally a further operator is added to indicate that an action φ happens only counterfactually. It hasn't actually happened but it might have done. Lisanyuk uses the symbol E to indicate 'might ability'.

$E[\alpha \text{ cstit}]\varphi$	Subject α might have (had) some general strategy to see-to-it-that φ (might-ability)
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Lisanyuk asserts that in the case where subject α might have done φ there is an additional conjunct whereby subject α allowed it to happen that $\neg\varphi$.

$E[\alpha \text{ cstit} \varphi] \wedge \langle \alpha \text{ cstit} \neg\varphi \rangle$	Subject α might have had some general strategy to see to-it-that φ , but didn't
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If action φ is permissible and if subject α might tentatively do action φ , then it is obligatory for them to do so. To not do so is a contradiction of the categorical necessity of the obligation. The expression asserts that allowing something to not happen is equivalent to a deliberative act of making it not happen.

12 The Strategic versus the Deliberative

Given this is more forceful than the generalised strategic motivation associated with *cstit*, Lisanyuk proposes contrasting this with a more deliberative motivation, as follows:

<i>cstit</i>	generalised goal-oriented action whereby the subject is not consciously aware of the link between the action and the strategic objective
<i>dstit</i>	deliberative action of which the subject is consciously aware of the specific objective

Lisanyuk uses this difference to assert the following:

$$\mathbf{E} [\alpha \text{ dstit}] \varphi$$

Expression **Pop** doesn't state the implications of this, but they can be identified as follows:

$\mathbf{E} [\alpha \text{ dstit } \varphi] \wedge \neg [\alpha \text{ dstit } \varphi]$	Subject α might have taken deliberative action that sees-to-it-that φ but purposefully didn't
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Thus Lisanyuk identifies the essential motivation for disaffection and resentment. While praiseworthiness involves action associated with generalised goal-setting, in contrast blameworthiness carries the implication of deliberative action.

13 Conclusion: a Matter of Degree

Lisanyuk's analysis makes the degree of resolution linked with praiseworthiness in statement **Plu** less than that linked with blameworthiness in statement **Pop**. This implies that the subject's accountability for blameworthiness is judged to be of greater significance than that for praiseworthiness, and accordingly more liable to the applicable consequences such as guilt and rebuke. Lisanyuk's analysis implies that the pluralist is more deserving of affective (in this case negative) sentiment in the eyes of the populist than is the populist in the eyes of the pluralist. The resentment felt by any indicative subject subscribing in their convictions to expression **Pop** will be greater than the sense of respect felt by any indicative subject subscribing to expression **Plu**. Thus, the logical dimension of epistemics reveals that, while the disaffection and resentment conjured by

Prof. Helbig in his attack on perceived injustices caused by THIS will show some sense of personable identification with the school and its children, they will by necessity carry greater emphasis and have greater efficacy than the integrity and honesty expressed by the school community in its assertion of Social Pluralism. Hence the appeal of representing populist arguments for the press.

Biography

Philip Armstrong has been Director at Thuringia International School Weimar since 2013. He has worked at international schools for almost thirty years, including at Vienna International School in Austria, Zurich International School in Switzerland, Munich International School and the International School of Ulm/Neu Ulm in Bavaria, and also several schools in Japan and China. He is also a graduate of the Royal Academy of Music and a music composer. His musical portrayal of Frege's 'Sense and Significance' was recently performed by the Bournemouth Symphony Orchestra in the UK conducted by Kirill Karabits. His opera 'The Orpheus Oracles', written recently to celebrate the 2019 centenary the foundation of the Weimar Republic and of the establishment of German democracy, and the thirty year anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, encompasses the work of Weber and Schmitt and all of the Weimar philosophers mentioned in this article.